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Jurisdiction of the Court
The Supreme Court of Canada
by Professor Peter W. Hogg*
I. ESTABLISHMENT OF COURT
THANK YOU PROFESSOR Jacoby. The Supreme Court of Canada
was not established by Canada's Constitution, which is the British
North America Act, 1867 (B.N.A. Act). The Canadian framers of the
B.N.A. Act assumed that after confederation (union) the Privy Council in
England would continue to serve as the final court of appeal for Canada,
so that there was no pressing need for a Canadian court of final appeal.
The Supreme Court of Canada was established in 1875-eight years after
confederation-by a statute of the federal Parliament. The constitutional
authority for this statute is discussed later in this paper.1
The Court originally comprised six Judges; a seventh Judge was ad-
ded in 1927; ahd tyro more Judges were added in 1949, bringing the num-
ber up to its present figure of nine. There is a statutory requirement that
three of the nine Judges must be appointed from Quebec. 2 The purpose
of this requirement is to ensure that there will be some Judges on the
Court versed in the civil law. Although there are no statutory require-
ments as to the origin of the remaining six Judges, in fact from 1949 until
1978 a pattern of regional representation was consistently maintained
under which three Judges were appointed from Ontario, two were ap-
pointed from the four western provinces, and one was appointed from the
four Atlantic provinces. In 1978 this pattern was broken when a Judge
from Ontario (Spence J.) retired and was replaced by an appointment
from British Columbia (McIntyre J.). There are now only two Judges on
the Court from Ontario, and there are three from the western provinces.8
The Court is not required, either by the B.N.A. Act or by statute, to
sit as a full bench of nine Judges. On the contrary, the Supreme Court
Act specifically provides that any five Judges shall constitute a quorum. 4
This quorum has remained unchanged despite the increases in the num-
ber of Judges from the original six to the present nine. The composition
of the bench for each case is determined by the Chief Justice. Most cases
have been heard by the bare quorum of five. However, constitutional
cases have usually been heard by more than five Judges and often by the
* Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto. LL.B., New Zealand; LL.M.,
Harvard; Ph.D., Monash University, Australia.
I Page 41, below.
2 Supreme Court Act, REV. STATS. CAN. 1970, c. s-19, s.6.
I One of the two Ontario judges, Estey, J., was also born and raised in the west.
4 Supreme Court Act, s.25. Contrast the position in the United States, where the refer-
ence in art. III, § 1 of the Constitution to "one supreme Court" is regarded as requiring the
participation of all Justices in all decisions.
39
CANADA-UNITED STATES LAW JOURNAL
full Court. Full Court sittings have become much more common for all
classes of cases under the present Chief Justice (Laskin C.J.).
The Judges of the Court are appointed by the federal executive.5 The
provinces have no role in the selection of Judges, and are not in practice
consulted before an appointment is made. Nor is there any requirement
that appointments be ratified by the Senate or the House of Commons or
by a legislative committee. In practice there is some confidential consulta-
tion with the organized bar, but no public scrutiny of appointments.
These basic facts about the Supreme Court of Canada reveal a num-
ber of differences between it and the Supreme Court of the United States.
Perhaps the most remarkable point is the fact that the Canadian Court's
jurisdiction and composition-and indeed its very existence-depend
upon an ordinary federal statute, the Supreme Court Act. The Court's
jurisdiction or composition could be radically altered-in fact, the Court
could be abolished-by the unilateral action of the federal Parliament. It
must be remembered too that in Canada's system of parliamentary gov-
ernment, the federal Parliament is effectively controlled by the federal
executive (the Prime Minister and his cabinet). Canada is therefore in the
curious situation that the Court which now has the final power of decision
in controversies between the central government and the provinces exists
by the grace of the central government. In fact, of course, the Court has
now won a highly respected place in the scheme of Canadian government,
and no federal government would ever contemplate the abolition or dimi-
nution of the Court. Nevertheless, there is widespread agreement that the
Court should be entrenched in the constitution by an amendment to the
B.N.A. Act, and that the provinces should play a role in the selection of
the Judges. Constitutional amendments to accomplish these objectives
have been agreed to by the central and provincial governments, but have
always foundered because of the existence of more controversial constitu-
tional amendments in the same package.
H. ABOLITION OF PRIVY COUNCIL APPEALS
Before the Supreme Court of Canada was established in 1875 the Privy
Council in England served as a final court of appeal for Canada-as well
as for other British colonies. This role continued even after the establish-
ment of the Supreme Court of Canada. Not only was there an appeal
from the Supreme Court of Canada to the Privy Council, there was also a
"per saltum" appeal from the provincial courts of appeal directly to the
Privy Council which by-passed the Supreme Court of Canada altogether.
In 1888 an attempt was made by the federal Parliament to abolish ap-
peals to the Privy Council in criminal cases, but this was later held to be
unconstitutional,6 and appeals in criminal cases were not validly abol-
5 Id. s.4.
Nadan v. The Queen [1926] A.C. 482 (P.C.).
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ished until 1933. 7 Appeals in civil cases, including the per saltum appeals,
were proposed to be abolished in 1939 by the federal Parliament. The bill
to accomplish this result was "referred" to the courts (references are dis-
cussed later in this paper)8 and held to be constitutional.9 The bill was
enacted in 1949, and it cut off appeals for all cases commenced after De-
cember 23, 1949. Only since then has the Supreme Court of Canada been
the final court of appeal for Canada.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY FOR COURT
The constitutional authority for the establishment by the federal Par-
liament of the Supreme Court of Canada is s.101 of the B.N.A. Act:
The Parliament of Canada may, notwithstanding anything in this Act,
from time to time provide for the constitution, maintenance, and organi-
zation of a general court of appeal for Canada, and for the establishment
of any additional courts for the better administration of the laws of
Canada.
There are two branches to the authority conferred by s.1O1. The first
branch authorizes the establishment of "a general court of appeal for Ca-
nada," and that is the constitutional basis for the establishment of the
Supreme Court of Canada. The second branch authorizes the establish-
ment of "any additional courts for the better administration of the laws
of Canada," and that is the constitutional basis for the establishment of a
system of federal courts (the second branch of s.101 will be briefly dis-
cussed later in this paper.)10
As the first branch of s.101 stipulates, the Supreme Court of Canada
is "a general court of appeal for Canada." This phrase contemplates a
court with a jurisdiction which is not confined to matters within federal
jurisdiction. Now that Privy Council appeals have been abolished, the Su-
preme Court of Canada stands at the top of the hierarchy not only of
federal courts, but of provincial (state) courts as well. It hears appeals
from both classes of courts, and those appeals may raise questions of con-
stitutional law, of federal law, or of provincial (state) law, or of some mix-
ture of the three. The Supreme Court of Canada is therefore the final
authority on the interpretation of the entire body of Canadian law: fed-
eral constitutional law, provincial constitutional law, federal statutes, pro-
vincial statutes, federal common law, provincial common law, and (in ap-
peals from the province of Quebec) provincial civil law. Thus, the
Supreme Court of Canada is a "federal" court only in the formal sense
that it is established by federal law. From the standpoint of its plenary
jurisdiction it is as much a provincial court as a federal court. The fact
British Coal Corp. v. The King [1935] A.C. 500 (P.C.).
£ Page 44, below.
'A.-G. Ont. v. A.-G. Can. (Privy Council Appeals) [1947] A.C. 127 (P.C.).
10 Page 45, below.
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that a case raises only a question of provincial law does not affect the
right of appeal, and a large number of such cases are in fact appealed to
and disposed of by the Court.
When the Supreme Court has to determine a question of provincial
law it might perhaps be expected that it would defer to the decisions of
the courts of that province (or at least decide the question as a court of
that province would have done), and that it would tolerate divergent doc-
trine which had been developed in different provinces. This is not what
has happened at all. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins" has no place in the
law or practice of the Supreme Court of Canada. The Supreme Court of
Canada always makes its own determination of any question before it,
even if it is a question of provincial law, and it does not hesitate to re-
verse a decision rendered by a provincial court of appeal in a case raising
only questions of provincial law. The Supreme Court of Canada does not
tolerate divergences in the common law from province to province, or
even divergences in the interpretation of similar provincial statutes. Such
divergences do develop from time to time, of course, but they are eventu-
ally eliminated by the Supreme Court of Canada. The assumption of the
Court, which is shared by the Canadian bar, is that, wherever variations
can be avoided, Canadian law, whether federal or provincial, should be
uniform.'2 Needless to say, each province has a distinctive body of statute
law, and Quebec also has a distinctive body of civil law (instead of com-
mon law); but the final interpretation of even these unique provincial
laws lies with the Supreme Court of Canada." Of course, even the over-
riding jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Canada cannot make these
distinctive bodies of law uniform. But, apart from distinctive provincial
statute law and Quebec's civil law, the law in Canada is generally uniform
across the country, and does not differ from province to province. 4 This
makes the body of judge-made law in Canada much less complex than
equivalent doctrine in the United States, where discrepancies between
the laws of various states have usually developed.
If a province would prefer that litigation in a field within provincial
jurisdiction be finally disposed of at the level of the provincial court of
appeal, it cannot constitutionally give effect to that preference. It has
11 (1938) 304 U.S. 64.
12 For a heretical argument to the contrary, see A.S. Abel, The Role of the Supreme
Court in Private Law Cases 4 ALTA. L. REv. 39 (1965); P.H. RUSSELL, THE SUPREME COURT
OF CANADA AS A BILINGUAL AND BICULTURAL INSTITUTION 218 (Information Canada, Ottawa,
1969).
1 We shall later note that the court may refuse leave to appeal a decision raising a
question of law particular to a single province, but its power to grant leave and to hear the
appeal is not in doubt, and is in fact exercised from time to time. Appeals in civil law cases
are quite common, for example.
14 J. Willis, Securing the Uniformity of Law in a Federal System-Canada 5 U. To-
RONTO L.J. 352 (1944); P.W. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA 123 (Carswell Co., To-
ronto, Ont., 1977).
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been held that the power to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada can-
not be limited by provincial legislation. Two reasons have been advanced:
(1) that such a law is in relation to "a general court of appeal for Canada"
and therefore within exclusive federal legislative competence under s.101
of the B.N.A. Act; and (2) that such a law is inconsistent with the terms
of the Supreme Court Act which as a federal law prevails over the incon-
sistent provincial law.15
IV. SUBJECT MATTER OF COURT'S CASE-LOAD
What kinds of cases does the Supreme Court of Canadi actually end
up deciding?
First in importance, but not in numbers, are constitutional cases. In
Canada the term "constitutional case" usually means a controversy about
the distribution of legislative competence between the federal Parliament
and the provincial Legislatures. It is the federal-provincial distribution
of powers which constitutes the only important limitation on the compe-
tence of the federal Parliament and provincial Legislatures, and therefore
it is the only important ground of judicial review.
The B.N.A. Act did not include a bill of rights, and none has subse-
quently been added by amendment. In 1960 the federal Parliament en-
acted the Canadian Bill of Rights,' 6 which contains many provisions simi-
lar to the American Bill of Rights, but the Canadian instrument was
never added to the B.N.A. Act by constitutional amendment, and was
never made applicable to provincial laws. Even so, the Supreme Court of
Canada in R. v. Drybones (1969) 1 7 held that the Canadian Bill of Rights
did have overriding effect on other federal statutes which violated its
precepts. But this doctrine has not actually been applied in any case
other than the Drybones case itself, which struck down a drunkenness
law which was applicable only to "Indians." The Canadian Bill of Rights
has not therefore become an important tool of judicial review. The prov-
inces of Saskatchewan, Alberta and Quebec have also enacted their own
bills of rights,'8 but they too are ordinary statutes and they have not yet
had the effect of actually invalidating an inconsistent statute. Prime Min-
ister Trudeau has consistently attempted to secure agreement from the
provinces to a constitutional amendment adding a bill of rights to the
B.N.A. Act and making it applicable to provincial as well as federal laws,
but this initiative, along with all the other proposals for constitutional
reform which have been put forward in the last ten years, has never come
to fruition.
Constitutional cases (meaning distribution-of-powers cases) consti-
'5 Crown Grain Co. v. Day [1908] A.C. 504 (P.C.), striking down a Manitoba statute
purporting to abolish appeals from decisions relating to mechanics' liens.
16 REV. STATS. CAN. 1970, Appendix III.
1 [1970] S.C.R. 282.
,8 HOGO, supra note 14, at 432.
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tute only a small proportion of the Canadian Court's work. From 1950
(following the abolition of Privy Council appeals) to 1974, the Supreme
Court of Canada disposed of fifty-nine constitutional cases, an average of
only 2.5 per year. Since 1975 the number of constitutional cases has risen
somewhat, as can be seen by the following figures:
Reported in [1975] S.C.R. 5
Reported in [1976] S.C.R. 5
Reported in [1977] S.C.R. 9
Reported in [1978] S.C.R. 14
To be reported in [1979] S.C.R. (estimate) 8
It is too early to tell whether these figures presage a permanently larger
volume of constitutional litigation. Even if they do, it is obvious that con-
stitutional cases will still not dominate the Court's docket.19
The subject matter of the remainder of the cases decided by the Su-
preme Court of Canada has been analyzed every year since 1961 by the
editors of the Osgoode Hall Law Journal. Each annual volume of the
Journal contains a statistical analysis of the work of the Court in the pre-
vious year. For details these tables should be examined. However, I shall
attempt to describe the case-load in general terms. The single largest cat-
egory of reported cases2 ° is tort cases (12 in 1961; 19 in 1976). They are
closely followed by criminal cases (11 in 1961; 10 in 1976); review of ad-
ministrative agencies (12 in 1961; 11 in 1976); and taxation (8 in 1961; 7
in 1976). Then every year there is a large variety of cases covering most of
the other fields of the law, including wills and trusts, contracts, commer-
cial law, bankruptcy, debtor-creditor, insurance, corporations, partner-
ships, family, intellectual property, real estate, municipal law, govern-
mental liability, expropriation (eminent domain), civil procedure and
evidence.
'9 The Court has heard the following numbers of appeals and references:
1975 160
1976 152
1977 120
1978 124
These figures include unreported decisions, but not applications for leave to appeal.
The figures for applications for leave to appeal are displayed at p. 50 infra. All these figures
were supplied to me by Bernard C. Hofley, Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada.
20 Criminal cases are the largest category if unreported cases are also counted. The
large number of criminal cases is probably explained by the mandatory jurisdiction over
many criminal appeals (p. 48, below) and by the availability of legal aid. See generally W. J.
Braithwaite, Developments in Criminal Law and Procedure: The 1978-79 Term 1 S.C.L.R.
187 (1980).
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Federal Courts
It will be recalled that the second branch of s.101 of the B.N.A. Act
authorizes the federal Parliament to establish "any additional courts for
the better administration of the laws of Canada." This branch of s.101
authorizes the establishment of a system of courts which are "federal" in
the traditional American sense of that term. No federal courts were in
fact established immediately after confederation in 1867. In 1875, at the
same time as the Supreme Court of Canada was established, a federal
court called the Exchequer Court of Canada was established. As its name
implied, this court had a very limited jurisdiction over questions involv-
ing federal revenue and the federal Crown (government). Over the years
this jurisdiction was increased to cover copyright, trademarks, patents,
admiralty, tax, citizenship and a few other matters regulated by federal
laws. In 1971 the Exchequer Court was abolished and replaced by the
Federal Court of Canada.21 The new court inherited the jurisdiction of
the former Exchequer Court, but it was also given additional jurisdiction,
including the power to review the decisions of federal agencies and offi-
cials. Not only is the jurisdiction of the Federal Court somewhat broader
than that of the Exchequer Court, its structure is more elaborate.
Whereas the Exchequer Court consisted only of a trial division (from
which an appeal could be taken directly to the Supreme Court of Ca-
nada), the Federal Court has a trial division, called the Federal Court
Trial Division, and an appeal division, called the Federal Court of Appeal
(from which a further appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court of
Canada).
The Federal Court of Canada (or any other federal court) cannot be
granted plenary powers akin to those of the Supreme Court of Canada.
The B.N.A. Act nowhere defines the "judicial. power of Canada" in terms
similar to Article III, § 2, of the Constitution of the United States. But s.
101 stipulates that federal courts may be established "for the better ad-
ministration of the laws of Canada." It has been held that this phrase
defines the limits of federal jurisdiction. The Federal Court of Canada
can be given jurisdiction only over questions arising out of "the laws of
Canada," meaning federal law. It was recently decided that the Federal
Court Act was unconstitutional to the extent that it purported to confer
on the Federal Court jurisdiction over a dispute governed by Quebec's
civil law22 and over a dispute governed by Alberta's common law. 3 The
Canadian courts have so far made little progress in developing doctrines
akin to the American doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction.
These recent decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada offer no solutions
" Federal Court Act, STATS. CAN. 1970-71-72, c.1.
Quebec North Shore Paper Co. v. Canadian Pacific [1977] 2 S.C.R. 1054.
3 McNamara Construction v. The Queen [1977] 2 S.C.R. 655.
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to the problems of joining claims and parties where some are governed by
provincial law and some by federal law and some by both.
2 4
The reason why Canada does not have a well developed body of law
defining the limits of federal jurisdiction is that until recently it has not
been needed. In the absence of any contrary provision, the provincial
courts have plenary jurisdiction over all classes of cases, whether gov-
erned by provincial law, federal law, or a mixture of the two. From all
accounts it appears that the administration of justice proceeded perfectly
satisfactorily from 1867 to 1875 when there were no federal courts at all.
After the Exchequer Court was established in 1875 its jurisdiction was so
narrow and specialized that most issues arising under federal law contin-
ued to be resolved in the provincial courts, and the opportunities for ju-
risdictional conflict were limited. The establishment of the Federal Court
of Canada with its broader jurisdiction is an important step in the direc-
tion of the dual court system of the United States. While opinions differ
on the desirability of this development, my own view is that it is a retro-
grade step. Already, as one would expect, there has been a considerable
volume of litigation on whether a particular action, or a particular claim,
or a particular party, is in the right court; and the courts have so far been
resolving these cases without any recourse to the American doctrines of
pendent and ancillary jurisdiction so that multiple litigation of a single
controversy is often going to be necessary.
It is perhaps worth repeating, however, that the broadening or nar-
rowing of federal jurisdiction affects only the jurisdiction of the Federal
Court of Canada. The Supreme Court of Canada is not confined to fed-
eral jurisdiction. It is a "general court of appeal for Canada. '1 5
V. APPELLATE JURISDICTION OF COURT
A. Scope
The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Canada is defined in the
federal Supreme Court Act. Section 35 of the Act fully reflects the
breadth of jurisdiction permitted by the B.N.A. Act. It provides:
The Supreme Court shall have, hold and exercise an appellate, civil and
criminal jurisdiction within and throughout Canada.
B. Civil Matters
In civil matters, before 1975 there was an appeal as of right in cases
where the amount in controversy exceeded $10,000. This loaded the
Court's docket with cases which were unimportant except to the parties.
In 1975 this appeal as of right was abolished.26 Most civil appeals now
24 P.W. Hogg, Case Comment (1977) 55 CAN. BAR REv. 550.
"5 Page 41 above.
28 STATS. CAN. 1974-75-76, c. 18, proclaimed in force January 27, 1975.
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require leave. 7
In the case of appeals from provincial courts of appeal, leave can be
granted by the provincial court of appeal itself "where, in the opinion of
that court, the question involved in the appeal is one which ought to be
submitted to the Supreme Court of Canada."28 The Federal Court of Ap-
peal has an identically expressed power to grant leave to appeal from its
own decisions.2 9 The Federal Court of Appeal recently emphasized that
its power to grant leave should be exercised only when the question was
one which "obviously" ought to be submitted to the Supreme Court of
Canada for decision. The court suggested three cases where that test
would be satisfied: (1) where the question was one of the constitutional
validity of a statute under the B.N.A. Act; (2) where the question was one
of the overriding application to a statute of the Canadian Bill of Rights;
and (3) where the question had been the subject of inconsistent decisions
of the Supreme Court of Canada (or Privy Council) or of provincial courts
of appeal.30 In practice leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada is
rarely granted by either a provincial court of appeal or the Federal Court
of Appeal.
3 1
The important power to grant leave is the power possessed by the
Supreme Court of Canada itself. It has this power:
where, with respect to the particular case sought to be appealed, the Su-
preme Court is of the opinion that any question involved therein is, by
reason of its public importance or the importance of any issue of law or
any issue of mixed law and fact involved in such question, one that ought
to be decided by the Supreme Court or is, for any other reason, of such a
nature or significance as to warrant decision by it.... 3-
Because the Court does not give reasons for the grant or denial of leave to
appeal, and because the process has not been systematically studied,
there is not yet any body of jurisprudence on the kinds of considerations
which the Court takes into account in determining applications for leave.
Generally speaking, however, the broader the significance of the case the
more likely it is that leave will be granted. Appeals raising constitutional
" So far as I can work out, the only exceptions are (1) an appeal from the decision of a
provincial court of appeal on a "reference" (references are discussed later in this paper, p.
50, below) by the provincial government Supreme Court Act, s.37; and (2) an appeal from
the decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in the case of a controversy between Canada
and a province or between two or more provinces: Federal Court Act, s.32. In these two
cases the appeal lies as of right.
28 Supreme Court Act, s.38.
2, Federal Court Act, s.31(2).
10 Minister of National Revenue v. Creative Shoes [1972] F.C. 1425, 1428 (F.C.A.).
31 B.A. Crane, Practice Note: Civil Appeals to the Supreme Court of Canada, 15 Os-
GooDE HALL L.J. 389, 390 (1977).
32 Supreme Court Act, s.41(1) (as substituted by the 1975 amendment); Federal Court
Act, s.31(3) (as substituted by the 1975 amendment); the quoted language is identical in
each of the two provisions.
19801
CANADA-UNITED STATES LAW JOURNAL
or civil liberties issues are likely to receive leave. The interpretation of an
important federal statute, or of a statute which has its couriterparts in
other provinces, or of an important point of common law, or of a will or
contract which is a standard form, are more likely to receive leave than a
unique statute or contract or unusual problem or a fact-dominated case
which may lack the element of public importance even if a large sum of
money is at stake.3 3 It is generally understood that a denial of leave to
appeal does not imply that the leave-denying panel of the Supreme Court
thought that the lower decision was rightly decided.
C. Criminal Matters
Criminal cases in Canada are tried in the provincial courts, despite
the fact that the "criminal law" is a federal responsibility under the
B.N.A. Act, s.91(27). There is a federally-enacted Criminal Code s" which
enacts a uniform body of criminal law for the entire count r. The Crimi-
nal Code makes provision for appeals in criminal matters from the pro-
vincial courts of appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada. There is an
appeal as of right in the following cases:
(1) a person denied habeas corpus by the provincial court of ap-
peal may appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada;3 5
(2) a person acquitted of an indictable offence whose acquittal is
set aside by the- provincial court of appeal (or a person tried
jointly with such a person and convicted) may appeal "on a ques-
tion of law";3 6
(3) a person convicted of an indictable offence whose conviction
is affirmed by the provincial court of appeal may appeal "on any
question of law on which a judge of the court of appeal
dissents";37
(4) a person found not guilty on account of insanity or unfit to
stand trial on account of insanity may appeal "on any question of
law on which a judge of the court of appeal dissents";3 8 and
(5) the Attorney General has the right to appeal from decisions
of the provincial court of appeal, setting aside a conviction, or
affirming an acquittal, ot affirming a verdict of unfitness to stand
trial on account of insanity, "on any question of law on which a
judge of the court of appeal dissents."39
It will be noticed that the right of appeal in cases (3), (4) and (5),
above, depends upon the existence of a dissenting opinion on a question
of law in the provincial court of appeal. Where the question of law exists,
but it has not attracted a dissenting opinion in the provincial court of
33 B.A. Crane, supra note 31 at 390-92.
34 Criminal Code, REv. STATS. CAN. 1970, C. C-34.
31 Id. s.719(3).
36 Id. s.618(2).
37 Id. s.618(1)(a).
Id. s.620.
39 Id. s.621.
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appeal, then an appeal lies only with the leave of the Supreme Court of
Canada.4 0 This appeal with leave lies only in the three cases stipulated
((3), (4) and (5), above) and only on a "question of law." Needless to say,
there is a body of jurisprudence on what constitutes a "question of law.' 41
These provisions (unlike the-admittedly vague-provisions regarding
civil appeals) 42 do not stipulate the grounds upon which leave should be
granted or denied, and the court does not give reasons for a grant or de-
nial of leave, so that there is no case law on the point.
D. Leave Applications
The foregoing account shows that the bulk of the Supreme Court of
Canada's appellate jurisdiction in civil matters, and much of its jurisdic-
tion in criminal matters, is now discretionary. The Court's discretion is
not exercised on a petition for certiorari, as is the discretion of the Ameri-
can Court. The Canadian Court's discretion is exercised on an application
for leave to appeal. The application takes the form of a notice of motion,
which is a short simple document requesting the Court to grant leave to
appeal, and briefly stating the grounds for the request.'3 The notice of
motion is often accompanied by an affidavit in which facts which do not
appear in the record of the courts below, but which bear on the public
importance of the case, are brought out, for example, the fact that a con-
tract in issue is a standard form which will affect a number of commercial
transactions. The record of proceedings in the courts below, including the
opinions rendered, also accompanies the notice of motion. Finally, coun-
sel for the applicant will file a factum (or brief) summarizing the legal
argument.44 Sometimes a factum in reply is filed by the respondent, al-
though this is not required by the rules. The factum is usually
short-about twenty letter-sized, double-spaced pages would be typical.
The application for leave to appeal is heard by a panel of three of the
Court's nine Judges. I have already explained that the Court is not
obliged to sit as a full bench of nine Judges, and that ordinarily five
Judges constitute a quorum.4 5 However, three Judges constitute a quorum
to dispose of applications for leave to appeal,'6 and the practice is to sit in
panels of three Judges for that purpose. The panel will hear oral argu-
ment by counsel for the parties, but each counsel is limited to fifteen
40 Id. ss.618, 620, 621.
"' MARTIN'S ANNUAL CRIMINAL CODE 1978, 529-31 (Canada Law Book, Agincourt, Ont.
1978).
4' Page 47, above.
4" Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada, Ht. 552.
" See generally id. at R. 55.
" Page 39, above.
" Supreme Court Act, s.45. Contrast the position in the United States where petitions
for certiorari are considered by all Justices, although there is no oral hearing, and a petition
is granted on the affirmative votes of four of the nine Justices.
'7 Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada, R. 56(5).
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minutes, with the applicant allowed a further five minutes for reply.4
This contrasts with the complete absence of time limits on counsel for the
oral argument of an actual appeal (or reference). In practice, however, the
fifteen-minute time limit is not strictly enforced.
Since the amendment to the rules in 1975, which abolished most
mandatory appeals in civil cases (although not in criminal cases), the
numbers of applications for leave to appeal have been as follows:
Year Dismissed Granted Total Heard
1975 198(69.7%) 86(30.3%) 284
1976 228(68.5%) 105(31.5%) 333
1977 235(71.7%) 93(28.3%) 328
1978 265(73.2%) 97(26.8%) 362
These figures, which were supplied to me by the Registrar of the
Court, indicate that there has been an increase in the number of applica-
tions for leave, and a decline in the proportion of applications granted.
However, it will require the passage of a few more years before any trends
can be noted with confidence. I have already mentioned that reasons are
not given for the disposition of an application for leave to appeal, and
that no systematic body of jurisprudence has developed on the grounds
upon which leave will be granted.4 8
VI. REFERENCE JURISDICTION
A. Federal References
The Supreme Court Act imposes on the Court the function of giving
advisory opinions on questions referred to the Court by the federal gov-
ernment. The relevant provision is s.55(1):
Important questions of law or fact concerning
(a) the interpretation of the British North America Acts;
(b) the constitutionality or interpretation of any federal or
provincial legislation;
(c) the appellate jurisdiction as to educational matters, by the
British North America Act, 1867, or by any other Act or law
vested in the Governor in Council;
(d) the powers of the Parliament of Canada, or of the legisla-
tures of the provinces, or of the respective governments thereof,
whether or not the particular power in question has been or is
proposed to be exercised; or
(e) any other matter, whether or not in the opinion of the
Court ejusdem generis with the foregoing enumerations, with
reference to which the Governor in Council sees fit to submit
any such question;
may be referred by the Governor in Council to the Supreme Court for
hearing and consideration; and any question concerning any of the mat-
48 Pages 47, 49 above.
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ters aforesaid, so referred by the Governor in Council, shall be conclu-
sively deemed to be an important question.
It will be noticed that the enumerated questions mainly contemplate
constitutional questions, but are not limited to constitutional questions.
In practice references of non-constitutional questions are very rare. The
questions which may be referred are not confined to issues concerning
federal legislation or federal powers. The constitutionality of a provincial
statute could be referred, for example, and this happens from time to
time.
The only body which can direct a reference to the Court is the "Gov-
ernor in Council." This phrase means Canada's Governor General and
Privy Council, which stand at the formal apex of Canada's federal govern-
ment; in practice, these bodies are only ceremonial; executive power is
wielded by the Prime Minister and his cabinet-the government of the
day. A reference to the Governor in Council is therefore legislative jargon
for the federal executive. The reference procedure is therefore a privilege
open only to government. A private individual or corporation or other
body cannot direct a reference to the Court.4 9
B. Provincial References
A provincial government has no power to direct a reference to the
Supreme Court of Canada. However, each of the ten provinces has en-
acted legislation permitting the provincial government to direct a refer-
ence to the prQvincial court of appeal.50 Each provincial law is broadly
framed, allowing the constitutionality of federal laws as well as provincial
laws to be referred, as well as nonconstitutional questions. Following the
pattern of the federal legislation, each provincial law confines the power
to direct a reference to the provincial government. A provincial reference
will secure an advisory opinion from the provincial court of appeal. How-
ever, when the provincial court of appeal has rendered an opinion on a
reference (as opposed to an actual case), there is an appeal as of right to
the Supreme Court of Canada.51 This right to appeal without leave means
in effect that the provincial governments enjoy the same privilege as the
federal government in being able to secure a ruling from the Supreme
Court of Canada on a controverted point.
C. Constitutionality
The rendering of advisory opinions to government is not traditionally
a judicial function for two reasons. First, it lacks the adversarial and con-
4, A second kind of reference, authorized by the Supreme Court Act, s.56, is the refer-
ence of a private bill by the Senate or House of Commons of the federal Parliament. I do
not know of any instance of this power being exercised.
50 For details, see B.L. STRAYER, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF LEGISLATION IN CANADA ch. 7 (Uni-
versity of Toronto Press, Toronto, Ont., 1968).
81 Note 27 supra.
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crete character of a genuine controversy; and, secondly, it is a function
normally undertaken by the executive branch of government, specifically,
the Attorney General. In Australia the High Court of Australia has re-
fused to render advisory opinions on the ground that it is a non-judicial
function. 52 And the Supreme Court of the United States has informally
indicated a similar constitutional objection to the function-an objection
which is undoubtedly consistent with the case law which surrounds the
requirement of a "case" or a "controversy" in Article In, § 2 of the Con-
stitution of the United States.
5 3
It would not have been surprising if the Canadian courts had held
that the rendering of advisory opinions was precluded by the B.N.A. Act's
description of the Court in s.101 as "a general court of appeal for Ca-
nada." When the point was litigated up to the Privy Council in the Refer-
ence Appeal (1912)5" the reference statute was upheld. Their Lordships
acknowledged that the function was not a judicial one, and emphasized
that "the answers are only advisory and will have no more effect than the
opinions of the law officers," but their Lordships held nevertheless that
the function could be conferred by statute on the Court. This decision is
often taken as authority for the proposition that no separation-of-powers
doctrine is to be read into the B.N.A. Act.55 The provincial reference stat-
utes seem never to have been squarely challenged, but have always been
accepted as valid. 5
D. Advisory Character
If the Court's answer to a question posed on a reference is "advisory"
only, then it is not binding even on the parties to the reference, and it is
not of the same precedential weight as an opinion in an actual case. This
is certainly the blackletter law which is repeated from time to time. But
there do not seem to be any recorded instances where a reference opinion
was disregarded by the parties, or where it was not followed by a subse-
quent court on the ground of its advisory character. In practice reference
opinions are treated in the same way as other judicial opinions.
E. Constitutional Adjudication by Reference
As noted earlier, the reference procedure is used mainly for constitu-
tional cases. The majority of constitutional cases decided by the Supreme
Court of Canada still arise out of a concrete case or controversy, but the
reference procedure accounts for a significant minority. From the time of
52 Re Judiciary and Navigation Act, 29 C.L.R. 257 (1921).
" L. H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 56 (Foundation Press, Mineola, New
York, 1978).
5, A.-G. Ont. v. A.-G. Can. (Reference Appeal) [1912] A.C. 571 (P.C.).
as HOGG, supra note 14, at 129, although, as there noted, separation-of-powers values
underlie other judge-made doctrines of Canadian constitutional law.
"' Id. at 130 n.81.
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confederation (1867) to 1966 one-third of all distribution-of-powers cases
decided by the Privy Council (up to 1949) or Supreme Court of Canada
originated as references.5 7 Since 1966 by my count this proportion has
declined to one-tenth.5 8 It is possible to speculate that the decline in the
proportion of references is caused at least in part by increased resort by
federal and provincial governments to direct intergovernmental negotia-
tions as the means of settling constitutional disputes. Another factor is
the increase in the number of constitutional challenges brought by pri-
vate parties,59 a development which has been facilitated by the Canadian
courts' acceptance of the action for a declaratory judgment as a means of
constitutional challenge, and by liberal rules as to standing.60
F. Early Resolution of Constitutional Doubt
The primary advantage of the reference procedure is that it enables a
government to obtain an early and (for practical purposes) authoritative
ruling on the constitutionality of a legislative programme. Sometimes
questions of law are referred in advance of the drafting of legislation;
sometimes draft legislation is referred before it is enacted; sometimes a
statute is referred shortly after its enactment; often a statute is referred
after several private proceedings challenging its constitutionality promise
a prolonged period of uncertainty as the litigation slowly works its way up
the provincial or federal court system. The reference procedure enables
an early resolution of the constitutional doubt.
G. Abstractne.s
The primary disadvantage of the reference procedure is that it often
presents the Court with a relatively abstract question divorced from the
factual setting which would be present in a concrete case. It has been a
common and justified complaint that some of the opinions rendered in
references have propounded doctrine which was too general and abstract
to provide a satisfactory rule. A number of the most important Canadian
cases are open to criticism on this ground.61
The most recent reference decided by the Supreme Court of Canada
provides a simple example. The case concerned the validity of a complex
scheme for regulating the market in eggs which had been enacted by com-
plementary federal and provincial legislation. Large quantities of factual
information were placed before the Court in the "case." 62 Oral argument
11 The exact figure is 68 out of 197: STRAYER, supra note 50, at 182.
58 Distribution-of-powers cases reported from [1967] S.C.R. to [1978] 2 S.C.R. inclusive
numbered 50 and only 5 were references.
Page 44, above.
60 Thorson v. A.-G. Can. [1975] 1 S.C.R. 138; Nova Scotia Bd. of Censors v. McNeil
[1976] 2 S.C.R. 265.
61 See the analysis by STRAYER, supra note 50 at 194-199.
Page 54, below.
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occupied four days. The Court took six months to write two concurring
opinions. But when the opinions are analyzed, they are found to be un-
clear as to whether or not the levies imposed on egg producers by a fed-
eral agency were wholly valid." Since this was one of the main points in
dispute, which had led the Ontario government to direct the reference in
the first place, the opinions were seriously deficient. An action by the fed-
eral agency to collect unpaid levies, or a suit by a dissident producer to
enjoin their collection, would have yielded a forthright outcome.6 4
H. Proof of Facts
It goes without saying that in constitutional cases factual issues often
have to be resolved by the Court. Some constitutional powers are exercis-
able only if certain factual preconditions are present, for example, federal
power is more extensive in an emergency, and over matters which are
national rather than local in their dimensions, and over trade which is
interprovincial rather than intraprovincial. In addition, it is often difficult
to understand a piece of legislation, and therefore to characterize it for
distribution-of-powers purposes, unless its actual effects are understood.
Also, the factual issues which have been raised in applying the Four-
teenth Amendment in the United States, for example, to determine
whether the provision of separate facilities for blacks and whites is in
compliance with equal protection, are potentially applicable in Canada
too, although the Canadian Bill of Rights applies only to federal laws and
has not yet accumulated a very sophisticated jurisprudence.
Proof of facts in constitutional cases is often difficult-in the United
States as well as in Canada-especially where the facts are of a "legisla-
tive" as opposed to an "adjudicative" character.6 5 But in a reference the
difficulty is compounded by the fact that a reference originates in a nor-
mally appellate court: there is no trial, and no other procedure enabling
evidence to be adduced. A statement of facts is sometimes included in the
"order of reference," which is the document which poses the questions
which the government wishes the Court to answer. Sometimes, too, other
material of a factual character is filed as part of the "case" which consists
of the documents which are filed for consideration by the Court. Most
often, however, no facts are recited in the order of reference, and no other
factual material is filed as part of the case; when such facts are recited or
factual material filed, the facts are open to the criticism that they have
been selected by only one of the parties, namely, the party which drafted
the order of reference (always the referring government) or the party
which prepared the case (usually the referring government). It would be
possible for the Supreme Court of Canada (or a provincial court of ap-
63 Reference re Agricultural Products Marketing Act [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1198.
"' The former proceeding has now been commenced.
65 K.C. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE vol. 2 s.12:3 (K.C. Davis Pub. Co., San
Diego, Calif., 2d ed., 1979).
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peal) to direct that oral testimony be given before it, and the court has
once, sitting as a full bench, heard oral testimony.6 6 More practical is the
method employed by the Supreme Court of the United States, when exer-
cising original jurisdiction, of delegating the task of hearing oral testi-
mony to a hearing officer, '6 7 but this device seems to have been used only
once in the Supreme Court of Canada.68 A final possibility is the intro-
duction of factual material in the factums (or briefs) of counsel. Tradi-
tionally (and according to the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada,
rule 29) the factums are summaries of legal argument, not vehicles for the
introduction of new facts, but from time to time "Brandeis briefs" have
been filed in which empirical data has been included in or appended to
the factum. The occasions on which this has occurred have mostly been
unremarked by the Court and unnoticed by scholars, but in the recent
Anti-Inflation Reference (1976),69 where one of the issues was whether
inflation in the 1970s had become an emergency justifying the exercise of
special federal emergency powers, the Court gave formal approval, in ad-
vance of the hearing, to the inclusion in the factums of economic evidence
on the nature and gravity of inflation, and the Court referred to the evi-
dence in the opinions which were written. The use of the factums as the
means for introducing facts in references may become more prevalent as a
result of this case.7 0
" Re Truscott [1967] S.C.R. 309 (a reference, but not a constitutional reference).
17 E.g., Arizona v. California 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
64 Re Eskimos [1939] S.C.R. 104 (the issue being whether "Eskimos" (Inuit) fell within
the word "Indians'" in the B.N.A. Act).
69 Re Anti-Inflation Act [1976] 2 S.C.R. 373.
7o For fuller discussion, see STRAYER, supra note 50, ch. 6; P.W. Hogg, Proof of Facts in
Constitutional Cases, 26 U. TORONTo L.J. 386 (1976).
I am indebted to my colleague Professor W.J. Braithwaite for reading and commenting
on an earlier draft of this paper.
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Questions for the Panel on Jurisdiction
William Harwick: Professor Gressman, is there a conceptual jurisdic-
tional problem with the Court mandating upon the general population
which is not a party to the case or controversy, compliance with the broad
remedy employed for historically established discrimination? I am asking
the question with reference to court ordered busing. Professor Hogg, I
believe you indicated that the Canadian Court would have power to re-
view such a question by reference. Is this correct?
Professor Gressman: I understand your question to be whether it is
consistent with the Court's jurisdiction to render broad decisions with re-
spect to large groups of the public that are not actually represented
before the Court. The answer depends upon how the issue is framed, par-
ticularly whether the case comes before the Court in the form of a class
action or whether a party such as a Board of Education, or a city or a
state government which presumably represents a large mass of individu-
als is the named party. In other words, I think as long as the case techni-
cally sits within the requirements of a case or controversy, the fact that it
may affect thousands if not millions of citizens by virtue of the decree
that is rendered does not present a jurisdictional problem.
It may be a matter of policy or constitutional judgment but I do not
see any jurisdictional problem other than whether the particular matter
comes up in the context of a justiciable controversy.
Professor Hogg: It is correct that in Canada the reference procedure
would overcome any problems of standing that might otherwise arise in
enabling private litigants to raise the question which has been referred.
Of course the reference procedure may only be initiated by the govern-
ment. If the government does not see fit to refer the question there will
be no resolution of the issue for a group that is trying to obtain a consti-
tutional ruling.
Sometimes by a series of nuisance litigations the government may be
persuaded to direct a reference in order to obviate the possibility of thirty
or forty cases milling around through the various court systems and creat-
ing a lot of uncertainty and difficulty. I think one could add to that the
proposition that the Supreme Court of Canada has, in a series of recent
cases, greatly liberalized the requirements for standing for a private party
in which the only relief sought is a declaratory judgment that a statute is
unconstitutional. The Court has accepted private causes of action in cases
where the party is raising an issue which otherwise could not be litigated.
In other words, if there is no person with obvious standing in the suit, a
general member of the public, but essentially a member of the public
who is affected by the statute in the same way as many other people, will
have standing to sue. The standing question rarely defeats constitutional
challenge in Canada.
Bryan Gray: My question is to Professor Gressman. When Canadian
lawyers read America Supreme Court cases we are sometimes bewildered
by the Court's application of the the Constitution to matters which do
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not really seem to fall within the subject matter of the United States
Constitution. It seems that the Court occasionally stretches the Constitu-
tion to decide a question of tort law, such as libel and slander in the case
of New York Times v. Sullivan, because the only way it can do so is to
find a constitutional issue. From a Canadian lawyer's standpoint, this ju-
risdictional position has posed difficult restraints upon the United States
Court which the Canadian Court has been spared because the Canadian
Supreme Court can review general questions of law. And because the Ca-
nadian Court can do this, it can leave the Constitution to the interpreta-
tion of true constitutional questions. Is this thesis correct?
Professor Gressman: It is a complicated problem. One response is
that the manner in which the Supreme Court addresses a constitutional
problem is dependent in part upon how the issue was presented by the
parties. The Court is not free to go out and make a declaration about tort
law or about any constitutional proposition if the parties have not prop-
erly raised the issue in constitutional terms with sufficient facts on which
to base a decision on that issue. This is part of the judicial process.
Mr. Sullivan: The issue has to be raised in constitutional terms for
the Court to hear it and if the Supreme Court of the United States wants
to hear it they will have to find a constitutional question.
Professor Gressman: The Court does not find constitutional ques-
tions. The Court decides questions that are raised and presented to it.
The Court does not go looking for constitutional questions. There is a
long tradition that the Court will not decide a constitutional question un-
til it is absolutely forced to by the facts and by the parties. They do not
have freedom t6 go looking for decisions to make without a case properly
having been presented in a concrete controversy.
Professor Hogg: I think perhaps the question reflects a difference in
the perceived limits of the judicial process between the two countries, a
difference which springs from the fact that the United States has always
had, or at least since the first ten amendments were ratified, a Bill of
Rights. This has made a number of issues matters for constitutional de-
termination in the United States which have never been matters for con-
stitutional determination in Canada, England, Australia or New Zea-
land. For example, decisions like apportionment cases, school
desegregation cases leading to busing and abortion cases simply have no
counterparts in any of those common law countries. I think it is probably
the presence of the Bill of Rights rather than any special difference in the
reasoning process of the Supreme Court of the United States which
makes its decision perhaps a little odd to the non-American observer.
Mr. McFadden: With the explosion in the number of proposals for
a National Court of Appeals, which solution would you advocate?
Professor Gressman: These proposals have been discussed as you
doubtlessly know for the last ten years. They seem to be coalescing at the
present time around the plan which I believe Senator Kennedy has pro-
posed in the Senate for the creation of a new kind of intermediate Court
of Appeals which is described variously as a National Court of Appeals or
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a Federal Circuit Court of Appeals. The court would have jurisdiction
over a combination of certain specialized subject matter cases such as tax
cases, claims against the United States, customs cases, patent cases, per-
haps some administrative law cases and administrative review proceed-
ings. The proposal would combine review of all of these subjects in a spe-
cialized Federal Court and take jurisdiction away from the other circuit
courts that presently exist. This centralization of review would eliminate
one of the problems that critics of the system have seen. The problem is
that at present by dispersing many of these matters among the various
circuit courts of appeals a number of conflicts of decisions are created
from time to time and many of those conflicts do not have sufficient im-
portance beyond the conflict itself to warrant attention and correction by
the Supreme Court. This is felt to be a serious defect in our system.
Therefore I think it would be quite satisfactory to my way of thinking to
create the specialized court in the areas where conflicts have arisen. The
federal system would thereby attain a uniform single court interpretation
of these often difficult and complex matters with no possibility of con-
flicts with any other court. The decision of the specialized court would, of
course, be left subject to certiorari review by the Supreme Court. That
essentially is what Senator Kennedy has proposed and the way in which
the problem is presently being addressed. I think it is the best way.
Seth Jacobs: Professor Hogg, if reference cases are truly only advi-
sory and carry no precedential value, what sort of deference would be
given to the Canadian Supreme Court's determination in a reference case
when and if another issue involving the case previously addressed comes
before the Supreme Court on appeal?
Professor Hogg: The hypothetical thesis is not really correct in that
the original 1912 decision of the Privy Council which accepted the refer-
ence procedure held the reference opinion will have no more weight than
the opinion of a law officer of the Crown. Just the same kind of weight
that is given an internal opinion in government. Nevertheless, in fact, the
reference cases have not had that effect at all. No one would consider
relitigating a question which had only a few years earlier been determined
by the Supreme Court of Canada on a reference because obviously they
are going to decide the question the same way.
Moreover, in practice they do treat the opinion as having the same
weight as an opinion in a concrete controversy. In argument there is never
any emphasis placed on the fact that a decision is a reference, suggesting
it should be given less weight. Canadian lawyers do not think in those
terms.
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